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Macaulay’s bastard children
A conversation with Sanjay Seth on the Code of History, 
Post-colonialism and Marxism.
Interview by José Neves
Once he completed his education in Sydney and Canberra, Professor 
Sanjay Seth held positions at Sydney University and La Trobe Uni-
versity, where he became one of the founding co-editors of the Journal 
Postcolonial Studies. He also held a Fellowship at Tokyo University. 
Then he moved to Goldsmiths College, University of London, in 2007, 
to take up the Chair in Politics and the directorship of the Center for 
Postcolonial Studies. He has published in the fields of modern Indian 
history, political and social theory, postcolonial theory and internation-
al relations. As he explains in the following pages, he is particularly 
interested in how modern European ideologies, and modern Western 
knowledge more generally, ‘travelled’ to the non-Western world. His 
work is trying to grasp what effects this had both on the non-Western 
world, and on modern Western knowledge (see his Subject Lessons: The 
Western Education of Colonial India, Durham, Duke University Press, 
2007). The following conversation was held when Professor Sanjay Seth 
was visiting the New University of Lisbon. José Neves conducted most 
of the conversation, trying to range from Seth’s first works on politics 
(Marxist Theory and Nationalist Politics: The Case of Colonial India, 
New Delhi, Sage, 1995) to his more recent interventions on the epis-
temological, cultural and political aspects of the writing of history. In 
the final part of the conversation, students and colleagues who were 
listening to the interview also addressed questions to Professor Seth. 
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José Neves – I will start with some personal questions… Let me quote 
parts of the last paragraph of your book Subject Lessons: “Western 
knowledge arrived in India through the coercive agency of colonialism. 
We were told, most forthrightly by Macaulay, that this knowledge was 
true and that our own knowledges, like our gods, were false. (…) None-
theless, that knowledge has now become global. There is no easy point 
outside it, no escape from it other than by engaging with and through 
it. (…) But if those who were once ‘subject to pedagogy’ can, long after 
they are gone, be studied in a fashion that subjects modern western 
knowledge to critical scrutiny, there is a pleasing irony in the thought 
that Macaulay’s bastard children will have contributed to the critical 
appropriation of a knowledge that was once imposed upon them.” We 
will surely return to this book as our conversation develops, but I 
would start by asking you to reflect about your childhood as a subject 
of western knowledge pedagogy… 
Sanjay Seth –Let me begin firstly by thanking you and my hosts for 
inviting me and giving me the chance to speak to you all, and for your 
hospitality. I have to apologize to you for the fact that I do not speak 
in Portuguese and you are having to make all the effort to follow me in 
another language. 
It has always struck me as odd that many people in India – but 
this is not uniquely an Indian phenomenon, it’s a much wider story 
than that – grew up in two worlds: one the world of formal knowledge, 
where they learnt science, rationality, etc., etc.; but also a world (this 
was sometimes represented or embodied by women in the family) of 
modes of being and of affect that were not secular, scientific, and so on. 
So – and this is not unique in India, and many of you probably have 
this experience –we inhabited two worlds, which however never really 
came together. Now, if we follow the logic of what I learnt at school 
and so on, some of the people around me, whom I cared deeply about, 
belonged to a world of superstition, or unreason, or irrationality… And 
yet, this world was all around me, this was not some minor remnant of 
a time past that had somehow survived into the twentieth century. So, 
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at some point, much, much later – I mean, obviously as a child I didn’t 
think of any of this – I became interested in how it was that so many 
of us managed to inhabit these different worlds without ever using one 
to reflect upon the other; it was if we kept them separated. 
But that came much later. In fact, my earlier work – the book you 
referred to on Marxist theory and nationalist politics – was my PhD. 
dissertation, which I undertook when I was a member of the Com-
munist Party in Australia and active on the left. And it began as the 
project of a militant; I was going to come up with really big answers 
to big questions - I was going to find the solution to what the Indian 
communist movement should have done and what it could now do. The 
arrogance of youth! But as it proceeded, it became a very different sort 
of enterprise. By the end of that project, which later became a book, 
some of the presumptions that I began with had now actually become 
problematic for me. And what I argue in that book is that the way 
Marxism in the colonies made itself relevant to countries where capital-
ist enterprise was not highly developed, where the proletariat was very 
small in numbers, and where otherwise Marxism really should have 
been irrelevant – was through the development of an analysis of impe-
rialism. Lenin argued that there is a global capitalist system, but it is 
not one that requires that all the elements of that system themselves 
be highly developed or capitalist. It was a brilliant analysis, and I think 
in many important ways, right. But one of its consequences politically 
was that what the Communist movement in the colonies, and certainly 
in India, ended up doing, was assuming that nationalism was progres-
sive in a twofold sense: it was politically progressive because it would 
be a blow against imperialism, and therefore would weaken capitalism 
globally; and it was historically progressive because nationalism repre-
sented bourgeois democracy, which is historically more advanced than 
feudalism. And the assumption here was that these two different senses 
of ‘progressive’ were isomorphic – they mapped onto each other. So, 
the anticolonial nationalist movement was progressive because it was 
anti-imperialist, and it was progressive because it was bound to be car-
ried by historically progressive social forces. By the end of that book, 
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I saw that this assumption that the two mapped on to each other was 
wrong, or at least, needed to be fundamentally rethought.
Soon after I finished that book, I also began to become more criti-
cal of each element of that argument, not just the assumption that they 
mapped onto each other, and this (with the benefit of hindsight) was 
the beginning of my move from Marxism to post-colonialism1 (which 
is not a term in which I have a great investment - it just represents 
a space from which to think), albeit a post-colonialism that remains 
indebted to Marx and conceives itself as part of the Left. More and 
more I became interested in critiques of the nation-state and critiques 
of nationalism in the colonies - not just the common leftist position 
that bourgeois nationalism is not radical enough in its nationalism, 
that it compromises with the imperialists, etc. – but critiques of the 
nation-state itself, and not just the insufficient realization of it. And 
the historicist narrative, which thought the bourgeois modern was bet-
ter than the so-called feudal, and therefore that the bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat were historically progressive classes, and the peasantry, 
even if it could be politically mobilized, was somehow the repository 
of something that was already part of the historical past, and destined 
to be consigned to the dustbin of history… This too now seemed to me 
extremely problematic. These doubts and questions led me to reflect 
upon the categories and the knowledge through which we encounter 
and understand the world, and much later (there’s a long gap between 
those two books) become central to my Subject Lessons: The Western 
Education of Colonial India, in which I address the issue of our forms 
of knowledge and their universality. 
There’s another way of describing my intellectual trajectory, 
which is retrospective: that is, it does not describe what I was thinking 
as these changes took place. But a lot of our recounting of our lives is 
retrospective, and all history writing is retrospective; it’s from where 
1 On this ‘journey’ see Sanjay Seth, “Modernity Without Prometheus: On Re-reading Marshall 
Berman’s All That Is Solid Melts into Air,” Third World Quarterly 33:7 (July 2012): 1377-86; 
published in Spanish translation as “Modernidad sin Prometeo,” in De Ruinas y Horizontes: 
La Modernidad y sus Paradojas, ed. Jorge E. Brenna B. and Francisco Carballo. (Cidade do 
México: Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana, 2014), 105-21.
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you are now that you look backwards and construct a coherent nar-
rative in which things link up in some sort of intelligible fashion. So 
the other way I could tell the story of my intellectual trajectory, and 
sometimes tell it to myself of my own work, is that what I was doing 
all along, without knowing it, was looking at how knowledges born in 
Europe travelled to the non-western world, first in the form of system-
atic ideologies, like Marxism (first book) and then, in a more general 
and a more ambitious sense, to look at how the whole corpus of modern 
western knowledge travels to the non-western world (in this case India) 
and what happened to it, as it travelled, what happened to the places 
that it travelled to, what the consequences of all this were.
From the critique of eurocentrism to the limits of history
JN – Part of your project, in a sense, participates in a general movement 
of critique of Eurocentric perspectives, namely historiographical Euro-
centric accounts of the non-western world, or of the history of Europe 
itself. And, of course, postcolonial theory or postcolonial theories – if we 
say it in the plural – actively participate in this critique. But, as you 
were mentioning, the problems that you were – at a certain point at 
least – facing… It was not just the problem that Eurocentrism poses to 
knowledge, but whether knowledge is in itself condemned to be some-
how ethnocentric, or parochial, or provincial, as your colleague Dipesh 
Chakrabarty puts it. This makes a clear difference regarding several oth-
er contributions to the critique of Eurocentrism, some of which want to 
achieve a “better science”, as you put in your article “Historical Sociology 
and Postcolonial Theory: Two Strategies for Challenging Eurocentrism”.2 
How do you look at these different types of critique of Eurocentrism?
SS – The article you refer to is deliberately very short, and partly be-
cause it’s short, it’s very stylized and exaggerated; you know… in two 
2 International Political Sociology, 3:3 (September 2009): 334-38. Translated into Portuguese 
as “Sociologia Histórica e Teoria Pós-Colonial: duas estratégias para desafiar o eurocentrismo,” 
Expedições: Teoria da História e Historiografia 7:1 (2016): 263-70.
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thousand words you make stark distinctions, and in this case I make a 
stark distinction between a historical sociological way of being anti-Eu-
rocentric and a theoretical-philosophical way of being anti-Eurocentric, 
and I declare my preference for the latter. Nonetheless I am sympa-
thetic to historical sociology. It seems to me an important enterprise 
to contest the conventional narrative about the making of the modern 
world, according to which capitalism and modernity first developed in 
western Europe and then spread outward. And a lot of recent work, 
some of which I admire, has sought to contest that by showing that the 
discovery of the Americas was absolutely essential to the emergence of 
capitalism and modernity, and that Africa and Asia were not simply 
the recipients of a modernity that came with gunboats and goods and 
colonialism, but were actually involved in its production, albeit unwit-
tingly and under highly unequal, coercive and exploitative relations. 
It seems to me that work of this sort in historical sociology, which of 
course varies in quality, is extremely important. 
However, to the degree that such work is driven by the desire to 
undermine Eurocentrism, I think it’s hostage to empirical fortune, be-
cause it’s essentially an empirical argument. And, you know, one day 
I was talking to a colleague and I asked myself: what if someone could 
definitively show that the Eurocentric account was true? It’s never 
going to happen, because in such complex stories, there will always be 
endless room for argument. But, in principle, it could happen: there 
could be an overwhelming empirical case for showing that the conven-
tional story is right. Would we then give up our anti-Eurocentrism? 
Is it only dependent upon empirical data? It seems to me not, and it 
seems to me that it is important that we recognize that political and 
ethical desire is invested in our contestations of Eurocentrism. So, an 
empirical account might not be the best way of achieving the end that 
one is seeking to achieve. But a second and more important reason for 
being critical of anti-Eurocentric historical sociology was the one you 
alluded to, namely that I became more and more interested in the lim-
its of our knowledge systems, and it seemed to me that anti-Eurocen-
tric historical sociology was trying to correct what it saw as biased or 
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problematic explanations by producing ‘better’ explanations. But these 
better explanations still accept the fundamental categorical grounds of 
the Social Sciences. A lot of my work, especially the more recent work, 
for at least the last decade, if not more, has been interested in what the 
limits of those categories are… 
So, in summary, while I think that the distinction I make in the 
short article is real, it’s perfectly possible – for instance as a teacher 
– to combine the two forms of anti-Eurocentrism. When I teach my 
undergraduates, I make available to them a historical-sociological lit-
erature which contests the conventional account of the development of 
modernity; at the same time, I try to push them in a sort of theoretical, 
post-colonial direction. 
JN – You were mentioning that you need to problematize the catego-
ries we use while analysing past realities – that kind of work is a work 
without which you could not even imagine doing history nowadays. I 
mean, it’s as if there is no distinction between your theoretical reflec-
tion on what is the practice of history and the practice of history itself. 
And you gave an example on your first answer regarding your personal 
account of your past: the case of religion. How do we, secular intellec-
tuals – if not in our private life, in our public activity – engage with 
religion as an object of study, and the difficulties it raises? The case of 
religion could also be made referring to magic, myth or even memories, 
of course…
SS – Can I start with religion? Because the problem with religion is, 
as you say, how do we deal with the fact that the academy, the social 
sciences, are scientific, secular, etc and yet very large numbers of peo-
ple are not… How do we, as historians for instance, write about those 
whose world is not like that? The question has been very well raised by 
my friend Dipesh Chakrabarty. But the problem is not simply that our 
categories are secular and yet the subjects we study are not always so, 
but that even the category of religion is a problematic one. We assume 
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that there is something called religion, a genus of which Hinduism, Bud-
dhism, Christianity, Islam, etc. are the different species. Now, I want 
to suggest to you, drawing upon the work of Talal Asad, Jonathan Z. 
Smith, Peter Harrison and many others, that the very category of reli-
gion is, in some important ways, actually a Christian category, because 
the construction of the idea of religion as something which is universal 
but then particularized rested upon the idea that religion is essentially 
a matter of belief. On the basis of this understanding of religion you 
could catalogue Hindus as those who believe this, Buddhists as those 
who believe that, and so on and so forth. But the idea that religion 
consists of ‘beliefs’ is itself a product of the Protestant Reformation 
and its aftermath, as Peter Harrison has shown. And there are parts of 
the world, even today, where religion is simply not a matter of belief, 
and where therefore the category of ‘religion’ is a deeply problematic 
one. I’ll give an example, one that comes from the horse’s mouth. Max 
Müller, who is often called the founding father of comparative religion, 
and who was a brilliant Indologist, worked in Oxford. Müller never 
went to India, because he felt that the India of the nineteenth century 
would disappoint him bitterly, it would be dirty and dusty and hot; 
he preferred his India of ancient grandeur and of Sanskrit texts. When 
the first generation of Indians began to go to Oxford and Cambridge - 
these were elite Indians who hoped to sit the Indian civil service exams 
when they went back - Müller was very excited, because he could now 
actually ask contemporary Indians about their religion. In a revealing 
footnote to one of his books he describes how he ran after these young 
men to ask them questions. (In my mind’s eye I imagine these poor 
young men, first subjected to the appalling weather and the appalling 
food of England, already suffering culture shock, and then, on top of 
that, confronted by this professor who runs after them to ask them 
questions!) Muller himself describes how when he asked them “What 
do you believe?”, they would look at him puzzled and say: “We don’t 
understand your question.” Because for them Hinduism was not a mat-
ter of ‘beliefs’, in the same way that Japanese people today can go to 
a Shinto shrine and to a Buddhist temple even on the same day, and 
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they see no contradiction between these two activities; because these 
are practices, not just ‘beliefs’ happening in our heads. So, the category 
of religion is a prime example of one of those modern categories deeply 
imbedded in our history, so thoroughly naturalized that we all use it - 
me too! But actually it won’t serve its purpose, it’s not a universal cat-
egory.3 Sorry, there is a second part to your question, which I forgot…
JN – We can return to the second part, because you also mentioned 
a problem with another category, which is the category of belief. In 
some of your texts, you argue that actually one thing that historical 
practice entails is that there is something that is a subject that pro-
duces knowledge and that gets to know something due to that produc-
tion – something that is exalted as an object… Differently from this, 
mythological accounts do not stress this division between what we are 
speaking about and what is being discoursed, represented, in the sense 
that there is no clear division between representation and reality. When 
you state that we are never studying something that is beyond our 
research agenda, our perspectives, doesn’t that come close to the ways 
myth develops?
SS – You are quite right that some of the things I am working on now 
are in part about this question. I gave religion as an example of a spe-
cific category just now. The past and the ways we represent it is anoth-
er example, at a higher level of abstraction. History-writing mobilizes 
all these categories: religion, civil society, state, etc. And I think history 
as a category also needs to be interrogated. I think that it too, like 
‘religion’ and ‘belief’, has built into a series of presumptions, of which 
one of the most important, as you’ve just pointed out - one which is a 
presumption of all of what I call ‘modern, western knowledge’- is that 
knowledge is a relation between a knowing subject and an object. Now, 
again, this is so deeply imbedded in us, myself included, that these are 
3 See Sanjay Seth, Subject Lessons: The Western Education of Colonial India. (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2007), 62-69.
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not just things we believe, these are almost part of our muscle memory, 
I mean, these have been part of our way of inhabiting the world. So it’s 
very hard to get the critical distance from it, to even see that this is a 
presumption, not a fact about the world. One way we could do that is 
to know that there are other people in the world, some from times past, 
some our contemporaries, who do not make this presumption. The 
point is not initially whether we are right or whether they are right, 
it’s just to be able to relativize ourselves in the sense of being able to 
see ourselves as particular and not universal… to see our knowledge as 
“our knowledge”, and not as Knowledge as such, with a capital letter. 
Now, in a moment I’ll get to history, which is the big category… 
But let me give you an illustration of how I came to problematize the 
subject/object distinction in a very concrete way. It comes from Subject 
Lessons, from the first chapter, on cramming. I collected a lot of his-
torical material on how the British and many Indian educators, public 
officials, colonial officials, etc., complained all the time that Indian 
students, having been provided with modern knowledge in schools and 
universities, chose to pass their exams by cramming, by which the com-
plainants meant rote learning - memorizing everything. And this is a 
persistent complaint across 150 years. Educators and others tear their 
hair out in frustration as they voice this lament: “We finally provided 
these people with the right way to know the world, and what do they 
do? They do exactly what they did with their traditional knowledges, 
namely learn it all off, memorize what we teach them, and then they 
regurgitate it in the exams, and to make matters even worse, some-
times they regurgitate it quite well, and they get good marks in their 
exams! But we are failing in what we set out to do, which is to educate 
them, to actually engage and know the world in a new way, not in their 
old ways.” Now, it took me a very long time - I’m embarrassed now 
how long it took me - to ask what is the most fundamental question: 
namely, what presumptions do you have to make to see rote learning 
as a failure of knowledge rather than a form of knowledge? Rote learn-
ing has a long history, not only in the non-western world but also in 
the western world. You know, Thomas Aquinas was greatly admired 
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because he had committed hundreds of texts to memory. Why and 
when did we start thinking that to memorize something is a failure of 
knowledge rather than a form of it? And once I asked this question, 
and it took me an embarrassingly long time to realize this was the real 
question, then my work was easier, because then I could see that built 
into our conception of knowledge is an almost Romantic subject, who 
must encounter the world and make the knowledge of it his or her own. 
It’s only genuinely knowledge if, as it were, it wells up from inside us. 
If it’s simply a repetition of something else, then it’s not genuinely ac-
quired. Now that, it seems to me, is a very fine illustration of how the 
subject-object relation defines what we understand to be knowledge, so 
that when we encounter any other form of knowledge, it only seems to 
us like a failed form of knowledge. 
As a teacher in a modern university, I tell my students: “do not 
rote learn”. So my point is not to say “return to rote learning”; the point 
is to recognize the historical and cultural specificities of our forms of 
knowing. And I think that applies to history writing as well. 
JN – But what about the category of history itself?
SS – Ok, let me be provocative and say we normally assume that his-
tory has a very long genealogy: there were the great Greek historians, 
some great Roman historians, then a not-so-great period for a very, 
very long time – most of the medieval period – and then we get to the 
Renaissance, and so on. I want to suggest to you that history writing, 
as we understand it, is actually a quite modern invention, and that the 
genealogy that we normally give it is largely fictional. We should all 
read Herodotus, but the idea that this is the precursor to history seems 
to me utterly fanciful. And Thucydides makes up the speeches of many 
of his historical actors; the famous Melian dialogue is in Thucydides’ 
words, not anyone else’s words. It seems to me that we academics con-
struct these elaborate genealogies for ourselves in order to endow our 
present activities with a dignity that goes back thousands of years. 
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So, if it’s true that history is a modern practice, no more than a 
few hundred years old, and in its academic and professionalised form, 
even less, then it seems to me it’s also true that history as a practice 
has a series of presumptions built into it. One of these is that the past 
is dead; one of the most important presumptions of modern history 
writing is that the past is dead, you can’t resurrect it, you can’t bring 
it back to life… You know the famous quote from Ranke, that everyone 
quotes, that the task of history is to represent what really happened? 
This is endlessly quoted as the charter of objectivity, and nowadays 
people proceed to criticize it, because objectivity is considered impos-
sible, the facts don’t speak for themselves, etc. I think what’s often 
missed, and what seems to me more important, is that Ranke is saying 
that history is a cognitive enterprise; it has nothing to say morally, eth-
ically, theologically etc. Why is it a cognitive enterprise? It’s a cognitive 
enterprise because the past is dead; we can only know it, nothing else. 
Now, all peoples have a sense of historicity. I think a sense of his-
toricity is universal. But not all people think of the past as dead, as we 
do. Now we get to your question: what privileges our sense of history 
over theirs? I’m asking myself that question and increasingly it seems 
to me that I am not sure that our sense of historicity is privileged in 
relation to that of others. That doesn’t mean we should stop doing it. 
We can’t stop doing it; it’s a feature of our culture, of our institutions 
and collective practices, etc. But I think it would be useful to start 
thinking about the limits of our knowledge forms rather than constant-
ly assuming their inevitable superiority, and assuming that they lie at 
the telos of a development where modern history writing is superior to 
and supersedes all the other forms of historicity that have characterized 
human life. 
Subaltern Studies and Maoism
JN – As you were saying, almost all historians nowadays would recog-
nize that our historical accounts of the past are accounts that depend 
on a certain point of view, which is our present point of view; what 
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they perhaps do not accept is the inexistence of the past as something 
objective, as something that is not only the cause but also the effect 
of a specific sense of historicity. Still, I was wondering if we can find 
within the debates among historians some indications of the past as 
something presumed by historians and not simply a fact of the world. 
For instance, all the critiques that medieval or early modern histori-
ans make against modern, contemporary historians, saying that they 
actually don’t study the past, but that they study the present, that 
their objectivity is less accurate because they actually are studying 
the period they are living within. Even if cunningly, this suggests the 
subjectivity of the division between present and past. And another in-
dication can be seen on the debates on memory, which you know much 
better than me. For instance, the concept of ‘trauma’ is a concept that 
we, as historians, are often available to accept and that encompasses 
the idea that there is a past that has not yet passed. So, perhaps even 
modern western history opens the door for some of the arguments you 
are making.
SS – Absolutely! Look, I would be mortified if anyone here thought 
I was claiming that I had come up with all these reflections solely by 
myself … Like all of us, I’ve learnt so much from others. So, the point is 
not originality; I’m absorbing like a sponge… So, I’m very much indebt-
ed to Hayden White, Ranajit Guha, perhaps above all, to my friend 
Dipesh Chakrabarty, and to many others. And I’m engaging with and 
drawing upon modern western knowledge, not opposing it. You began 
by quoting from the end of Subject Lessons, where I describe myself 
as one of “Macaulay’s bastard children”. I teach in a university, and a 
university, by definition, is an institution of modern western knowledge. 
So, I’m not against this knowledge, I’m trying to think through it; its 
possibilities and also its limitations. 
On the first part of your question, you’re right… to the degree 
that anything is ever settled in the human sciences, I think that is set-
tled. Today, very few historians would claim, in a Rankean mode, that 
history is objective. So, that is sort of largely finished. 
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We all agree that there is a past. I’m not saying pasts are made 
up. But, as I will be arguing on Friday, there isn’t a past that we just 
stumble upon, there isn’t a past in the sense that there are rocks or 
there are trees. The past is an object that has to be constituted. This 
is a point made by Lévi-Strauss, by Louis Althusser, and many others. 
And ‘pastness’ is constituted in different ways. I give an example in 
one of my essays:4 in India, people of my class get horrified that ‘ordi-
nary’ people will walk up to the wall of a historic monument and piss. 
Middle-class Indians with a historical sensibility are always horrified: 
“What’s wrong with these people? Don’t they realize that this is part 
of our glorious national past… and here they are, pissing on it!” But 
it’s not that these people are stupid, it’s not that they don’t have a 
sense of pastness, for they have myths, epics, legends… they very much 
have a sense of pastness, but it’s not constituted on similar thoughts or 
grounds as ours. So, I think there is a past, but we never encounter a 
past in the raw, we always construct it in advance. And I think modern 
history writing is one way of both constructing the past and construct-
ing a relation with it. And I think epic, for instance, is another way of 
doing that. 
Pastness, I think, is a human universal. So my argument is not 
that there are people without a past; I think there are people without a 
sense of modern history, but they have other relations with their past. 
JN – Let me just insist on this, but now trying to move to a different 
place... One of the major problems you have been working on is how 
modern western knowledge – and you make a strong argument on the 
need of defining it both as modern and western, that is, giving it a 
time and a space – encounters or disencounters itself from non-western 
pasts. At the same time, you also mention that this kind of disagree-
ment between the code of history, the code of modern western knowl-
edge, and the pasts it’s trying to grasp happens as well when modern 
4 “Reason or Reasoning, Clio or Siva?,” Social Text 78 (2004): 85-101; translated into Portugue-
se as “Razão ou Raciocínio? Clio ou Shiva?,” História da Historiografia, 11 (April 2013): 173-90.
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western knowledge faces pre-modern (even if western) pasts. There’s 
a text you wrote where you quote Michel de Certeau when he refers 
to the ways we, modern European intellectuals, fail to engage or to 
analyse our pre-modern ancestors in relation to religion or other mat-
ters. But then sometimes you also say that there is a specificity on the 
disagreement between western knowledge and non-western pasts, that 
there is a kind of more deep disagreement, I would put it like this. Why 
the distinction?
SS – There is a wonderful quote from Michel de Certeau, who address-
es this question. He says something like: “The modern French historian 
writing about seventeenth-century France, can encounter in his subject, 
or the text he is studying, someone who attributes agency to the Chris-
tian god. So this person, or this text, is explaining certain historical 
events as a consequence of God’s agency”. And Certeau says, what his-
tory-writing does is reverse the order of explanation. He uses the apt 
metaphor of castling – I don’t know if any of you play chess, but in chess 
there is a moment when you can ‘castle’ the rook with the king, that 
is, swap them over. Similarly, when the text explains things as an effect 
of God, the modern historian explains belief in God as an effect of the 
world. The text says: the social is to be explained in terms of God; we 
say: God is to be explained in terms of the social. Now, this is an exam-
ple of how the modern historian of Europe confronts the same problem 
as the modern historian of India, or Africa, or anywhere else. I think the 
difference is that for the historian writing about Europe (and it doesn’t 
matter whether the historian is European or not, for this is not about 
identity; it’s the knowledge form that matters, not the person doing it) 
can presume that that text of the seventeenth century has some sort of 
historical continuity with the now, with our knowledge systems now. In 
other words, in Gadamerian terms you can say: “There can be no fusion 
of horizons between me and this text because we cannot agree on God 
as an agent. However, in encountering this seventeenth-century text, I 
encountered an earlier moment in my own tradition, a tradition which I 
now re-appropriate and revivify, which I keep alive through changing it.” 
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Now, what happened in India and in many colonial countries is 
that, instead of a continuity, there was an absolutely sharp break, a 
caesura. Sanskrit knowledge forms and vernacular knowledge forms 
were alive and flourishing at one point, and then suddenly there’s a 
cut-off, an abrupt end. So for the historian of India, I think there’s 
a deeper problem. He or she has the same problem as the historian 
of France, but with the addition that he or she cannot even assume 
the historical continuity which will ‘redeem’ the anachronism that the 
European historian also faces. And this is because of that sharp line 
dividing us from past traditions of thinking. In Europe you can read 
Renaissance texts or medieval texts and, even if they sound strange to 
you, they’re not purely or not necessarily purely of historical interest, 
right? People can read them as if they were in some way alive. The 
striking thing in India, the one place I know a little bit about, is that 
hardly any scholar reads earlier texts as if they spoke to the present. 
They’ve become the subject of annotated editions. The only approach 
you can have to them is a historical approach. In Europe you can read 
Aristotle or Aquinas as if they were interlocutors, part of an ongoing 
tradition (it does not matter for present purposes that this tradition 
might be constructed); but there is nothing in our past which still has 
that status (at the level of formal knowledge - it is very different in the 
‘popular’ domain), because the break has been so profound.
JN – Let me make one final question. The move we were discussing 
some minutes ago, that is, from a critique of Eurocentrism to a critique 
of the limits of Social Sciences, can also be identified with the trajec-
tory of the Subaltern Studies group. In this case there was also a first 
attempt to provide an alternative and better history … And then, from 
the mid-80s on, there was a turn from this kind of Marxist scientific 
approach to a more post-structuralist, postmodern (if we can use this 
word) approach. Is this correct? Your work is actually much more en-
gaged with this second kind of Subaltern Studies approaches, close to 
Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Provincializing Europe, to quote what is perhaps 
the most relevant – for us, historians – of many other titles. Could you 
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talk a bit about your relation to the Subaltern Studies group. I know 
Ranajit Guha was your PhD supervisor…
SS – I should say, first of all, that I was never a member of Subaltern 
Studies. But it is true that in some ways intellectually it was very im-
portant for me. I was influenced by Subaltern Studies, very much so.
Now to answer your question, I agree with your distinction, but 
I’d introduce one qualification: I don’t think Subaltern Studies ever, 
even in its beginning, sought to be scientific. Ranajit Guha, who was 
such a decisive influence, especially but not only over the early volumes 
of Subaltern Studies, was certainly a Marxist, and was influenced by 
Maoism, but he never aspired to scientific socialism, and least of all the 
kind that came from Eastern Europe. But it is true that there was a 
change, partway through the project. This also split the group to some 
degree – one of its very important members, and a friend and teacher 
of mine, Sumit Sarkar, became a very vocal critic of the group that he 
once belonged to, on the grounds that it had missed its vocation by 
becoming a form of culturalism and being hijacked by postmodernism, 
when it should have stayed resolute, should have remained an intelli-
gent and critical form of Marxism. 
I think that the change, however, actually arose out of the logic 
of the project itself. In the programmatic statement that opens volume 
one, Ranajit Guha says something about the ‘failure of the nation to 
come into its own’. And what was present in that remark was the idea 
and the desire that the nation could come into its own; that the prob-
lem with the Indian nationalist movement was that it was, in some 
sense, insufficiently radical. I think a few years later many members of 
the group are beginning to think: “Well, that may be true. But there 
is a problem with the nation-form in itself, whether in its radical ver-
sion or in its non-radical version”. Similarly, I think the project in its 
early stages had a sense that somehow you could recuperate a subal-
tern consciousness and agency. And I think that along the way – again 
partly because of external influences, post-structuralism, certainly the 
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interventions of Gayatri Spivak and others – some people in the group 
began to think that the aim should not be to recuperate an insurgent 
subject, but to problematize the idea of subjectivity itself. So, I think 
there was without a doubt a change in the group, but I think it was 
partly driven by its own earlier presumptions coming under critical 
examination by those who were using them. But that was an uneven 
process: some people did that more than others and, you know, one of 
the striking things about Subaltern Studies, and I say this as someone 
who was not a member of it, is that the earlier volumes had a greater 
thematic unity, because there was a shared sense of a project, and later 
on there are still many interesting articles, but it’s clear that there is 
no common project any more. 
JN – You mentioned also the relation between Maoism, as a political 
movement and ideology, and Subaltern Studies. Could you just develop 
that a little bit?
SS – I’ve written about it, arguing that Subaltern Studies could not 
have been possible without a short-lived Maoist uprising in India in the 
late 60s.5 This was short-lived, was decisively crushed and, in the big 
screen of history, it looks like a tiny little blip. But I think for cultur-
al and intellectual politics it was quite important. And the reasons… 
well, I would have to rehearse a long argument, which I won’t do. But 
I think one of the consequences of that uprising was that a section of 
the left, instead of desiring modernity in the form of the socialist mod-
ern, became more willing to interrogate the premises and promises of 
modernity. Instead of wanting a more genuinely emancipated Indian 
nation-state that would be free of imperialism and colonialism and 
comprador elements, it started to ask questions about whether the 
nation-state could ever be an adequate vehicle for expressing the aspi-
rations and desires of a very large place with all sorts of diverse people. 
5 “Revolution and History: Maoism and Subaltern Studies,” Storia della Storiografia 62:2 
(2012): 131-49.
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In other words, I think that Maoism as it played out in India (and not 
so much Mao per se) actually somehow unleashed other critical ener-
gies and became important. And I think Subaltern Studies tapped into 
and was partly shaped by those critical energies. There were of course 
also biographical connections. Ranajit Guha was in India - I think it 
was at the later part of that insurgency - and wrote about it. Dipesh 
Chakrabarty was in a minor way involved in it. But not for me, I was 
six years old when the revolt in Naxalbari happened, so…
JN - …So, it’s not your fault.
SS – Yeah! [laughs]
*
JN – I now will open the floor for comments, questions, interventions…
Marcos Cardão – Thank you very much for such great insights. My 
question has to do with the first generation of Subaltern Studies. I was 
wondering if it is so resolutely Marxist because, when we think about 
peasant revolts, we see that they make a critique of the most common 
interpretation of western Marxism – seeing peasant revolts as pre-po-
litical, peasants always as irrational, superstitious, sustaining that they 
should make first a transition to capitalism and that only by then could 
they be explicitly political...
SS – Absolutely, and I’m glad you said that. Because when one’s 
talking, one simplifies. They were Marxist but they were already Marx-
ist with a very critical eye, and remember they were at odds with all 
the Marxist parties of India; they were never party intellectuals. They 
were already highly critical of the received tradition but, at the same 
time, seeking to work, kind of within it, while challenging and expand-
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ing and improving it. It’s also often said that the early volumes of Sub-
altern Studies were the “history from below” of the type pioneered by 
Hobsbawm, Rudé and others, now belatedly happening in India. And I 
think that’s wrong. I mean, it’s certainly true that everyone had read 
Rudé, Hobsbawm, Christopher Hill, and was deeply influenced… all of 
that is true. But, again, I think when it’s happening in India, you can’t 
repeat those moves, because you’re at a different place … So, I think 
they – Ranajit Guha in particular – were already self-conscious about 
the differences between what they were doing and the “history from 
below” that was being written in Europe. So I think you’re absolutely 
right: this was a very critical appropriation of Marxism, rather than 
simply an application of Marxism; and it had a friendly but critical 
relation to western Marxism, by which they were certainly influenced, 
but they were not simply reproducing it for Indian conditions. 
Rui Lopes – My question has to do with the dichotomy of west” 
and “non-west” and, in particular, with the risk of essentializing the 
“west”. Usually when you refer to Eurocentric ideas, the centre is not 
just Europe but specifically an elite within Europe. How can we find 
ways of pluralizing the different types of so-called reason within west-
ern society, since the same imperialist attitude that was applied to the 
history outside of the west was also applied to social groups within the 
geographical space of Europe?
SS – Thank you, that’s a very interesting question. I agree with you 
entirely that of course there was never an undifferentiated Europe, that 
imperial and colonialist expansion were not undertaken by ‘Europe-
ans’, they were undertaken by specific classes and groups, and we must 
always remember that and register that in our thinking. Moreover, Eu-
rope is a historical construct, there hasn’t always been a Europe. And 
so people who generalize about Europe are sometimes told: “Look, it’s 
not just one thing, it’s many things”. Of course that’s true; inasmuch as 
you make a historical point, you’re right. But for the colonized, there’s 
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a sense in which that distinction is not so important, because they were 
told for a very long period that there was a Europe, that Europe was 
the fount of reason, freedom, progress, etc. So, as my friend Dipesh 
puts it, it may be that the Europe we talk about is a hyperreal Europe, 
but it doesn’t make it in one sense any less real for that. 
Marxism, nationalism and Man
Sofia Lisboa – My question is a bit of a change in the subject. It’s 
much more about your work on Marxist theory and nationalist politics. 
In the conclusion of your book on these matters, you talk about how 
Marxism, in this context, became nationalist, and you don’t say there 
is a corruption in the sense of Marxism, it’s just that it was the way in 
which it realized it could achieve the goal for Marxism. So, my question 
concerns how Marxism had to use the problematic and the form of a 
national struggle…
SS – It’s an important question partly because it’s still a relevant ques-
tion in parts of the world. Now, I don’t think the desire for national 
independence was wrong … I mean, for goodness’ sake, the British had 
to get the hell out of India! This is not up for debate. I think the prob-
lem for Marxism, to put it slightly crudely, was that for understandable 
reasons, it confused the politically progressive and the historically pro-
gressive. And I think the unfortunate legacy of that was that Marxism 
(but not all Marxisms) often became a form of nationalism. And that 
never went away. In the postcolonial period, it often got worse. 
I give you the most depressing proof of all: the fact that today 
official Marxism is, for instance, amongst the biggest champions of 
India’s nuclear program. Why? Because India’s nuclear program is an-
ti-imperialist. What does that mean? It means America disapproves 
of it. We are fighting our battle for global justice basically by giving 
the finger to America! Now, frankly, this is the reduction of everything 
important to absurdity. I don’t give a toss that the western world says: 
“You’re abrogating rules”. The handful of powers that have the nuclear 
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bomb have no moral right to lecture anyone else. And the presumption 
that the United States, the only country to have used the bomb, has 
the right to lecture anyone else on acquiring the bomb is so outrageous 
as to defy anything. But that’s not the point. The point is: do we need 
the bomb? Is this a priority for us? And it seems to me that, unam-
biguously, the answer is no. And I think that the fact that the com-
munist Left is amongst the most resolute supporters of India’s nuclear 
program is one of the proofs of the fact that Communism or Marxism 
often ended up being a kind of nationalism on steroids, which would 
rationalize its positions using the language of anti-imperialism. Well, if 
this is anti-imperialism, frankly it doesn’t do us any good. I don’t know 
how this translates into the Middle East, but I can immediately think 
of at least a few instances in which, again under the guise of anti-im-
perialism, nationalist positions were legitimated that did not warrant 
the support of the Left. 
JN – I also have one question concerning this debate on Marxism and 
nationalism. It has to do with one of the most relevant issues you ad-
dress while debating this relation: the identification between progress 
understood as something that we politically and morally stand for, and 
progress as a concept of the world itself, that is, a concept of history it-
self. And the problem with this identification is that it entails a kind of 
looping effect: science is legitimizing politics and politics is legitimizing 
science. And this has also something to do with all the debates we were 
having regarding the writing of history and modern western knowledge, 
and with the fact that it seems that we always need to ground our own 
political, ethical and moral options on a scientific basis. So, at the be-
ginning you were saying that we often tend to shape the image we give 
of our own trajectory in order to give it some kind of coherence, but 
actually it seems to me that in your PhD thesis we can already see the 
critical approach to the relation between knowledge and politics that 
your more recent work has been addressing so clearly… This was not a 
question, actually....
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SS – It’s actually a very helpful observation because now I have a third 
way of re-describing my intellectual trajectory! I think there was a his-
toricist and teleological element in Marxism, which it shares with other 
Enlightenment derived philosophies, and there was a political element, 
and they were sutured together. To put it simply, what was historically 
progressive was equated with what was politically progressive: Marx-
ists declared that bourgeois societies are historically advanced, that a 
certain form of politics is politically progressive, and then they tried 
to marry the two. And another way in which I could characterize my 
intellectual trajectory is that I have been disassociating these elements, 
as well as questioning them individually. I still believe in politically 
progressive…I feel like I’m of the Left… not all of my Marxist friends 
would concur in that judgement, but I think I am! But certainly the 
teleological historicist narrative that has been part of Marxism I com-
pletely disavow, and moreover, I find it morally problematic.6 Because 
I think we really have to ask ourselves the question: if we believe in 
that narrative, what do we do with tribal peoples, with aboriginal peo-
ples, with indigenous peoples? It seems to me that both the Left and 
the liberal intelligentsia are hypocritical or, at least, very inconsistent 
on this. They say: “We’ll be nice, we’ll be liberal, we won’t say they’re 
backward anymore, we won’t call them primitive”; but actually our 
historicist and teleological intellectual presumptions leave us no choice 
but to regard such peoples as backward and primitive. I think that’s 
morally and politically unacceptable, and thus we must abandon the 
teleological and historicist presumptions that underpin our politics, 
and live with the undoubtedly problematic – because I don’t want to 
make it sound like it’s easy – consequences. One of these is that our 
political positions are no longer secured nicely in some sort of cement, 
whether scientific or historicist; they now begin to look a little more 
arbitrary, like the choices that they in fact are. The attraction of Marx-
ism, I presume for all of us, was that it allowed you to have a political 
6 On this, see my “Modernity Without Prometheus: On Re-reading Marshall Berman’s All 
That Is Solid Melts into Air,” Third World Quarterly 33:7 (July 2012); 1377-86, or the Spanish 
translation; op cit. 
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position with the conviction that this was not just an arbitrary choice 
but was somehow anchored in the movement of history and in the 
certainties of science. I still believe in the politics, I’m pretty shaky 
or sceptical on the science and I absolutely have no conviction in the 
movement of history. 
JN – One final question … You have already mentioned your relation 
to Marxism as a political and intellectual tradition, specifically your re-
lation to Subaltern Studies. You also mentioned your relation to some 
relevant authors, like Foucault, De Certeau and others. But there is 
one specific – I would not call it tradition – set of authors that is not 
a permanent presence in your work but still seems to play a relevant 
role for you. I’m referring to the case of the works of Bruno Latour, 
for instance, as they relate to your critique of Man itself as a histori-
cal construct. Can you talk a little bit about that? Because when you 
mentioned that history is something that does not exist, or the past is 
something that does not exist as trees exist or as objects exist, we could 
probably add that not even trees actually exist. And then I recall the 
problems you deal with in some of your articles related to religion, for 
instance on your article Clio or Shiva, where you give a brief account 
of this case, in the mid-70s I believe, when the Indian government 
supports a judicial case against the British Museum and the British 
court accepts it, considering Shiva ‘itself’ as a juridical person. Would 
you say that the problem of considering gods as potential subjects of 
history, with an agency of their own, is perhaps somehow similar to the 
problems that Latour is advancing when he demands a “parliament of 
things”? 
SS – That’s a great question to end this conversation. By the way, 
the story about Shiva, I should mention - I certainly do in the article- 
comes from Richard Davis’ book Lives of Indian Images. 
On your question, of course you’re right. A very major influence 
for me, as for certainly many people in this room, is the work of Michel 
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Foucault, and behind him Nietzsche. I tread lightly on the footnotes 
for the most part because, you know… the academy is a funny place, 
it’s sometimes a place where people display their knowledge through 
name-dropping, show they know all the latest trends… and it’s tedious; 
one uses these things because they speak to the questions you are ask-
ing, not because they’re footnote fodder. But Foucault … my God, I 
could not have written anything that I’ve written had I not read Fou-
cault; he’s a looming presence. Bruno Latour not in the same degree, 
but I think We Have Never Been Modern is a wonderful book, and I 
think everyone should read it. French anti-humanism generally, more 
recently Latour’s work, all of these have been enabling for me… I read 
these people avidly and I’ve learnt a lot from some of these figures you 
mentioned.
There’s another dimension to your question which I’ve now for-
gotten, I’m sorry. You mentioned those names and you also mentioned 
something else about… no, now I forgot, sorry.
JN – Me too [laughs]. So thank you very much for this conversation. 
For me it was really interesting.
SS – And thank you all for listening.
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